Hybrid event.

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Zoom URL: https://uni-frankfurt.zoom-x.de/j/62684266883?pwd=RDVFUDFWM0Y5S0N6dU5Ub25MV3lGQT09
Meeting ID: 626 8426 6883
Password: 900870

Abstract:

In the presence of leniency programs and under the reasonable assumption that firms have an easier time finding their cartels inhouse than the authority has finding them from the outside, the leniency-dilemma drives cartelists to invest sufficiently in gathering information about their cartels. In the 90ies, the literature showed that under vicarious liability firms may have too little incentive to invest in corporate compliance. Despite lowering the expected fine by preventing cartels, investments in corporate compliance may also increase the expected fine by increasing the probability of detection. If the first cartelist blowing the whistle is granted leniency, however, the effect of corporate compliance programs is unequivocally positive for undertakings. No further measures – like reducing the fine in case the firm runs a compliance program – are needed to incentivize the adoption of corporate complicance programs against cartels.