Hybrid event.

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Zoom URL: https://uni-frankfurt.zoom-x.de/j/66991504273?pwd=Mi47gRfbqPwcuN2zWrAbh1zjkVScI0.1
Meeting ID: 669 9150 4273
Password: 569461

Abstract:

Equality before the law is a fundamental principle. But not only the courts and the government are bound to behave impartially. Private actors are also often required to afford equal treatment to other parties. Examples include the duty of management in corporations to treat shareholders equally or the par conditio creditorum in bankruptcy. At first blush, this seems to introduce a distributional element in dealings among private parties. The paper instead advances an efficiency rationale for equal treatment. Using a simple model, shows that under plausible conditions an equal treatment rule better aligns the incentives of a privately informed agent with social welfare.