Corporate Silence

16 Nov 2026 14:15 - 15:30
HoF 1.01 + online
Robert E. Bishop

Hybrid event.

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Zoom URL: https://uni-frankfurt.zoom-x.de/j/69153968305?pwd=WdLah77KI8auhdM7mNRprksCHiVsJV.1
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Abstract:

This Article addresses the phenomenon of corporate silence, which I take to be the absence of expected corporate action. While many other areas of law recognize the relationship between action and nonaction, the lion’s share of the existing empirical corporate literature focuses on the action. This is understandable: one typically imagines the “cause” in cause-and-effect as a transpired action, and identifying nonaction may be difficult in practice. But difficulties in conceptualizing or capturing instances of nonaction do not make the phenomenon any less deserving of attention.

With this observation in hand, I extend the traditional event study methodology to examine the process by which the market incorporates information contained in nonaction. In so doing, I offer a means to test whether the absence of an expected action conveys economically valuable information.

I then provide empirical evidence of the informative nature of nonaction in the context of stock trades—or more specifically, the absence of expected stock trades—by corporate insiders. Using a simple model of expected trading activity, I show that stocks tend to underperform when insiders abstain from expected buying activity, and tend to outperform when insiders abstain from expected selling activity. I test implications of this finding, providing evidence that the effect strengthens with prolonged silence, and that silence can be used to predict good and bad news about the firm, as well as mergers and acquisitions activity.

I discuss the consequences of these findings not only for the law of insider trading and the study of markets, but also for the broader policy choice between disclosure and direct regulation. In particular, disclosure and direct regulation are complements, rather than substitutes, and the effects of corporate silence must be considered in any analysis of the tradeoffs between them.