(In)dependent Central Banks
Hybrid event.
To enter the virtual seminar room, please use the following login credentials:
Zoom URL: https://uni-frankfurt.zoom-x.de/j/65182098488?pwd=l75UW9tiNaAmfBZb1zgVbiwkmWbiH7.1
Meeting ID: 651 8209 8488
Password: 798542
Abstract:
Since the 1980s, many countries have reformed their central banks to enhance operational independence. Using biographical data, press coverage, and expert opinions, we find that during this period, appointments of central bank governors became increasingly politically motivated, particularly following legislative reforms intended to insulate central banks and their governors from political interference. Furthermore, we show that politically motivated appointments are associated with lower de facto independence and worse economic and financial outcomes. As central banks worldwide have gained greater power, our findings contribute to the debate on their democratic accountability and credibility.